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Turkmenistan 
 
Turkmenistan is a huge country of 50 million hectares – the fourth largest by area in the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) after Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Yet it has a small 
population of about 5 million people, which puts it in one group with the FSU midgets – 
Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Baltic republics. More than half the population (55%) 
lives in rural areas, compared to one-third in FSU, but only 4% of the country’s agricultural 
land (1.6 million hectares) is cultivable, compared to 40% in FSU. The remaining 96% of 
agricultural land in Turkmenistan is desert pastures – 38 million hectares fit only for flocks of 
karakul sheep and camels, not for human beings. Thus, despite the huge expanses and the 
small number of people, the effective population density in Turkmenistan is very high: there 
is only 0.6 hectares of arable land per rural resident compared to 2.3 hectares in FSU. 
 
Prior to 1991, agriculture in Turkmenistan was organized according to the standard Soviet 
model: some 600 large collective and state farms controlled the bulk of agricultural land 
while the rural population cultivated in its spare time tens of thousands of small household 
plots on 55,000 hectares, or about 3% of irrigated land. The structure of the farm sector has 
changed dramatically since then as independent Turkmenistan began to implement various 
agrarian reforms consistent with its interpretation of a market-oriented economy.  
 
Changing Farm Structure 
 
The main change in our context can be characterized as a shift from collective farming to a 
more individualized agriculture. The first step (1990-92) involved distribution of irrigated 
land to rural families, which more than doubled the total size of the household-plot sector to 
133,000 hectares. The second step (1993-96) involved a national program for allocation of 
land to independent private farmers who were allowed to engage in commercial agriculture 
outside collectivist frameworks. Today there are more than 5,000 such private farms in 
Turkmenistan (the numbers are very fuzzy) operating on 81,000 hectares. The third, and 
perhaps the most daring and radical step (1996-97) involved the transformation of former 
collective and state farms into associations of leaseholders. So-called “peasant associations” 
(daikhan berleshik) were summarily organized by presidential decree in place of the 
traditional collective and state farms, and each association was instructed to parcel out its 
large fields to individual leaseholders (typically heads of families).  
 
We view the creation of leaseholder-based associations as the most radical step of the land 
reform program because of its scope. The reforms aimed at household plots and private 
farms, however important, were marginal by the amount of land that they encompassed. The 
transition to leasehold contracts, on the other hand, involved more than 350,000 rural family 
units and 1.5 million hectares of arable land, i.e., practically the entire rural population and 
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  1 90% of arable land in Turkmenistan. The current structure of the farm sector in Turkmenistan 
is presented schematically in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Structure of the Farm Sector in Turkmenistan: 2002 
  Number  Land, ha  Average size, ha 
Associations  592  33,000,000 (incl. pastures)    
Leaseholders  357,000  1,500,000 (arable)  5.6  
Peasant farms  5,200  81,000  20  
Household plots  616,000  133,000  0.2  
 
The Role of Peasant Associations and Institutional Arrangements for Leaseholders 
 
Initially, when peasant associations were created by fiat in 1995, they had the potential for 
becoming yet another example of what is generally known in FSU as a “change of the sign on 
the door”: a formal organizational transformation without any substantive internal change. 
Yet the situation in Turkmenistan seems to have developed toward a genuine structural 
change since 1996-97. Although there are still 600 associations and they still legally control 
most of the agricultural land resources, they have become mere organizational shells, or 
umbrellas, for the farming operations of individual leaseholders, without significant 
commercial activity of their own. As of 1997, associations have virtually no “collective” 
sales: all sales reported through associations derive from their leaseholders. The associations 
have lost much of their fixed asset base (machinery, equipment, livestock), while inventories, 
receivables, and payables—standard signs of commercial activity—have shrunk almost to 
zero (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Characterization of Associations as a Shell for Leaseholders 
 2000 
Percentage of sales generated by the association, % of total reported sales  4.6 
Fixed assets, change since 1997 in percent  −40 
Inventories, change since 1997 in percent  −86 
Accounts receivable, change since 1997 in percent  −72 
Accounts payable and loans, change since 1997 in percent  −90 
Source: Aggregate financial statements of farm associations 1997-2000, MinAg.  
 
What is the role of the associations today? First, they are the “guardians” or “administrators” 
of state-owned agricultural land that is distributed to leaseholders for cultivation. All 
leaseholders interviewed in a large farm-level survey in 2002 report that they have a land-
lease contract with the association. Second, they are the municipal authority responsible for 
maintaining rural infrastructure in the villages—and they receive a certain payment from the 
leaseholders (in percent of production revenue) for these services. Third, and most 
problematic of all, they are the conduit for transmitting state orders to the leaseholders and 
enforcing compliance.  
 
The continuing existence of state orders in Turkmenistan is a legacy of the Soviet centrally 
planned system. Turkmenistan has liberalized much of its agricultural production and food 
trade, but the main strategic commodities—cotton and wheat (as well as the much less 
important rice)—remain subject to state orders. As in the past, production targets for wheat 
and cotton are assigned to large farming units—peasant associations in this case; and the 
association manager divides the overall quantities among the leaseholders so that the full 
target is met (or exceeded). The associations do not sell this wheat and cotton for their 
leaseholders, as a marketing cooperative would normally do in the West: the sale contract is 
  2 directly between the leaseholder and the state marketing organization, which sends trucks to 
collect the harvested crop and sometimes even tractors and combines to help with harvesting. 
The associations do not act as supply cooperatives either: leaseholders get all the inputs they 
need from state suppliers on the basis of individual contracts signed according to production 
targets.  
 
Finally, since the associations are neither marketers nor input suppliers, they cannot act as 
credit cooperatives for their leaseholders. All financial transactions in this system are handled 
by a state-owned agricultural bank – Daikhan Bank – which has a branch in every 
association, serving all the local leaseholders. The system is organized on the basis of 
“passbooks”, so that very little cash changes hands. Each leaseholder’s production quota is 
recorded in the “passbook”. The “passbook” shows the total credit for revenue that the 
leaseholder will eventually receive for deliveries of wheat and cotton and the total debit for 
inputs that he is entitled to get from the state. The revenue is calculated on the basis of fixed 
state prices, which are adjusted every year but are always far below the world market prices. 
The cost of inputs is also based on fixed state prices net of a hefty 50% subsidy for all inputs 
used in the production of state orders. The input debits, plus statutory management charges 
that go to the association, are offset against the revenue and the leaseholder keeps only the 
“profit”.  
 
This highly bureaucraticized system applies only to state orders, i.e., wheat, cotton, and rice, 
but it is designed in such a way that the leaseholder must deliver the entire output to state 
marketers: otherwise there will be no credit entry in the bank account to offset the debits for 
inputs. Commodities not subject to state orders, such as vegetables, milk, or eggs, are 
generally produced under different institutional arrangements on the family’s household plot 
and are sold in the nearby market or through occasional private traders: there are no state 
marketers to deal with these commodities and the association is not geared to provide 
cooperative marketing services.  
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The complex system of relationships between leaseholders and various state organizations is 
reflected in Figure 1, which shows the percent of respondents in the 2002 survey who signed 
contracts with input suppliers, product marketers, and the bank. Over 80% of respondents are 
bound to the state by credit and input supply arrangements. The percentages for marketing 
  3 contracts are deceptively low: leaseholders generally specialize either in grain or in cotton. 
The combined frequency of contracts with the Cotton Board and the Grain Board is 
accordingly around 100% (actually slightly more than 100% reflecting the existence of some 
mixed grain/cotton farming): all leaseholders are bound by marketing agreements to the state, 
with no independent commercial activity in the two strategic commodities. 
 
The Role of the Household Plot 
 
Leaseholders operate in a two-tier farming system. In one tier, they have 5-6 hectares of 
irrigated land leased from the peasant associations, where they grow mainly wheat or cotton 
for delivery to the state. In the second tier, they have a small household plot of about 0.25 
hectares on which they grow vegetables and keep some private livestock. The output from the 
household is in part consumed by the family and in part sold in the open market, without any 
intervention from the state. The income of most rural families thus includes cash income 
from the leasehold operation plus cash and in-kind income from the household plot. In the 
2002 survey, these two components were evenly balanced and jointly accounted for 75% of 
family income (Figure 2). The remaining 30% represent cash income from off-farm salaries 
of family members working outside the household, pensions, social transfers, etc. The 
household plot is thus a very important source of income for rural families, accounting for 
more than one-third of total income in value of own farm products consumed by the family 
and in cash from product sales. 
 
Fig. 2. Structure of Leaseholder Family Income










Private Farmers and Their Land 
 
In addition to leaseholders and their household plots, Turkmen agriculture has another 
relatively new component that began to emerge only in 1993. These are independent private 
or peasant farms that operate outside associations on land grants received directly from the 
state – not in the form of a lease from the association. The land in these private farms 
increased from zero in 1992 to about 100,000 hectares in 2001 and is close to catching up 
with the total land in household plots (130,000 hectares). There are about 5,000 private 
farmers in Turkmenistan, so that an average private farm is 20 hectares – much larger than 
the average leasehold in associations (5.6 hectares).  
  4  
Yet there is a serious problem with the quality of land in private farms. The declared 
government policy is to give private farms unirrigated, uncultivable land and thus force them 
to reclaim desert land at their own expense. In effect, the government has relinquished the 
responsibility for what was traditionally regarded as a public good in the Soviet era and today 
relies on private individuals to invest in land reclamation. The poor land quality in private 
farms is clearly illustrated by Figure 3, which shows that in 1993-95 cultivable land was only 
30%-40% of the holdings – compared to 80% in household plots. Yet it seems that the private 
farmers are doing exactly what the government intended them to do: they are actively 
reclaiming desert land on their farms and the share of cultivable land has steadily increased 
from the initial 30%-40% to 60% today. The picture that emerges from the 2001 survey of 
private farms is consistent with these national figures: among the respondent farms, 31% of 
the land was irrigation-ready from the start, another 37% was reclaimed by the farmers 
during their new tenure, and 32% is still unused and remains to be “opened” for cultivation in 
the future. 
 
Fig. 3. Share of Cultivable Land in Individual Sector












A Digression on Private Land Ownership in Turkmenistan 
 
Leaseholders receive land in use rights from the state through the intermediation of the local 
peasant association. The lease term is usually 5-10 years (this follows from the 2002 survey), 
but the production targets are set each year. The lease is nontransferable: if a family cannot 
farm, the leasehold reverts to the association for reassignment. Private farmers receive land 
directly from the state. Initially, the land is granted in use rights, but once the farmer has 
proved his willingness and ability to farm successfully (within two-three years), the land is 
transferred into “private ownership” and the happy farmer receives a special “land ownership 
certificate” from the authorities (sometimes directly from the hands of the President).  
 
We advisedly put “private ownership” in quotation marks, because the notion of private 
ownership in Turkmenistan is very different from the accepted notion in market economies. 
On paper, the 1992 constitution of independent Turkmenistan recognizes private land 
ownership. Yet the Land Code, which is the permanent law that interprets the constitution on 
land matters, elaborates, “Citizens of Turkmenistan have the right to receive in private 
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household farms …Those wishing to establish a peasant farm will lease land or receive land 
in private ownership with the right of lifetime inheritable possession…”. Thus, private 
ownership is forcefully equated with lifetime inheritable possession – a traditional Soviet 
form of land tenure. “Privately owned” land in Turkmenistan is non-transferable: it may not 
be sold, given as a gift, or exchanged; only short-term leasing is allowed under very special 
conditions. In practical terms, there is no difference between private farmers who get land in 
use rights and those who receive a “land ownership certificate” from the state. They have an 
asset that they can use but not dispose of in any way.  
 
Some Comparisons of Leaseholders and Private Farmers 
 
The most striking difference between leaseholders and private farmers is not in farm size (5-6 
hectares in leaseholds, 20 hectares in private farms): it is in the fact that leaseholders are 
subject to state orders while private farmers are allowed to grow whatever they wish. This is 
clearly reflected in the specialization of farms in the two groups (Table 3, based on 2001-
2002 surveys): leaseholders produce either cotton or wheat, with less than 10% of farms 
producing both cotton and wheat and only 5% diversifying into other commodities. Among 
private farmers, on the other hand, 15% produce both cotton and wheat while fully 34% 
produce commodities other than cotton and wheat. These other commodities are largely 
livestock products, which are very seldom reported by leaseholders. Nationally, the product 
mix of leaseholders in associations is 85% crops and only 15% livestock. Livestock 
production is concentrated mainly in the individual sector – private farms and household 
plots, where the product mix is diametrically opposite: 25% crops and 75% livestock.  
 
Table 3. Specialization at the Farm Level (percent of respondents) 
   Leaseholders  Private farms 
Cotton only  36%  8% 
Wheat only  50%  43% 
Cotton+wheat 9%  15% 
Other 5%  34%  (livestock!) 
 
Table 4. Sale Channels for Farm Products: Leaseholders and Private Farmers (percent of respondents) 
Channel Leaseholders  Commodity  Channel Private  farmers 
State 88  Cotton State 100 
Association 9 
Market 3 




   Vegetables  Market 80-100 
   Meat,  milk  Market  80-90 
 
The difference in institutional arrangements for leaseholders and private farmers is also 
reflected in different access to marketing channels (Table 4). Leaseholders sell primarily to 
the state, which is consistent with their obligation to deliver wheat and cotton under state 
orders. Private farmers use different channels for different products. Vegetables, meat, and 
milk – the products for which no state procurement exists – are sold in the open market. 
Cotton is sold to the state: in principle, private farmers have no obligation to sell to the state, 
but there are apparently no alternative sale channels for cotton – direct exports are prohibited 
– and they are obliged to sell to the state cotton board. Wheat is again in a different category: 
the state takes 70% of the harvest, but a respectable 20% is sold through alternative channels. 
There is a very clear lesson behind these numbers: if producers are given an opportunity to 
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presumably optimizing sales income.  
 
Despite the state orders and the constraints on individual choice, leaseholders appear to be 
quite happy with the new arrangements (Table 5; unfortunately no such data are available for 
private farmers). Most of the respondents in the 2002 survey report an increase in their 
motivation to work (compared with the situation in the former collective) and an 
improvement in their standard of living. Practically everybody is optimistic about the future 
prospects under the new system. At least in terms of popular attitude the agricultural reforms 
are a success. 
 
Table 5. Leaseholders’ evaluation of the situation under the new leasehold arrangements compared to the 
collective past (percent of respondents in 2002 survey) 
   Better than before the 
reforms 
No change  Worse than before the 
reforms 
Motivation to work  85%  11%  4% 
Standard of living  72%  23%  5% 
Future prospects  90%  6%  4% 
 
 
Outcomes of Agricultural Reform 
 
Proper assessment of the impacts of agricultural reforms requires detailed comparisons of the 
performance of the three institutionally different components of Turkmen agriculture: 
leasehold farms, household plots, and private farms. Unfortunately, neither national statistics 
nor our surveys provide the full information necessary for this kind of analysis. National 
statistical data only enable us to make a crude performance comparison between the 
“association sector” (i.e., leasehold farms) and the “individual sector” (mainly household 
plots, but also private farms). The results of this comparison are presented in Figure 4, where 
two features are worth noting. First the share of the individual sector in agricultural output 
increases over time, while the share of the associations decreases despite the transition to 
leasehold arrangements after 1996. In 1997, the first year of the main farm-structure reforms, 
each sector accounted for one-half of gross agricultural output. Five years later, in 2001, the 
individual sector produces 75% of agricultural output, while the association sector is down to 
25%.  
 
Another noteworthy feature is the ratio of output to land in the two sectors. The individual 
sector (household plots and private farms combined) control about 10% of cultivable land, on 
which they produce 75% of total output. Association leaseholds account for 90% of 
cultivable land, and yet they produce only 25% of total output. The relative productivity of 
the individual sector is thus 27 times higher than in the association sector.  
 
Neither feature is unique to Turkmenistan. Similar trends are consistently observed in all 
former Soviet republics, where in line with accepted theoretical considerations we generally 
attribute the performance differences to different incentives for individual farmers and 
workers of former collectives. Yet the institutional setting in Turkmenistan is unique in that 
the former collectives have shifted to individual leasehold arrangements. As a result, 
leaseholders presumably face incentives that are much closer to the incentives of individual 
producers than the incentives of workers in former collective farms in the rest of the FSU. 
We would have expected the leaseholders to achieve productivity levels that are much closer 
  7 to the individual sector and thus give a strong boos to Turkmen agriculture. This obviously 
has not happened so far.  
 
Fig. 4. Associations and Individual Farms: Output and Land
















The only possible explanation, in our view, lies in the sharp differences in the institutional 
production and marketing arrangements between the individual sector and the leasehold 
sector. Individuals are free to decide what to produce and how to sell, and individual farming 
is flourishing thanks to private initiative. Leaseholders are strictly bound by state orders on 
the relatively large areas that they receive from the association, and there is not much room 
for private initiative. It is particularly important to note that the second tier of leasehold 
farming – the household plots – is not subject to these restrictions and household plot 
production seems to be flourishing (as part of the individual sector statistics) while the 
association sector is struggling. We hope that future work will enable us to disentangle the 
performance of leaseholds and household plots in the same rural families participating in the 
2002 survey.  
 
Switching to a still broader national view, we see in Figure 5 that both agricultural output and 
GDP declined sharply after 1990. Some signs of recovery appeared in 1997-98 – 
coincidentally with the introduction of significant reforms in agriculture. We would like to 
hope that the incipient recovery is indeed linked with the impact of agricultural reforms, but 
only the future will show if this is so. Figure 5 incidentally reveals another important feature 
of rural Turkmenistan: the labor employed in agriculture is steadily increasing over time, both 
because of high natural increase of the rural population and because of lack of alternative 
employment opportunities outside agriculture. The combined effect of increasing labor and 
decreasing agricultural output of course has had a devastating effect on overall productivity 
of Turkmen agriculture.  
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Turkmenistan has implemented significant reforms in agriculture, increasing the size of the 
household plot sector, enabling the emergence of independent private farms, and most 
importantly individualizing to a certain extent the production arrangements in former 
collective farms through the introduction of leasehold contracts. Yet the policies underlying 
these reforms can only be characterized as half-hearted: state orders are retained for the main 
cash commodities (cotton and wheat), the producers are generally bound to monopolistic 
state marketers and input suppliers, and the independent private farmers who are relatively 
free from these constraints receive land of very poor quality that requires major investment in 
reclamation. It is not surprising that these constraints have a negative impact on the 
development of Turkmen agriculture and the performance of the new leasehold sector seems 
to be falling far short of its potential. 
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